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A current debate in psychology and cognitive science concerns the
nature of young children’s ability to attribute and track others’
beliefs. Beliefs can be attributed in at least two different ways:
prospectively, during the observation of belief-inducing situations,
and in a retrospective manner, based on episodic retrieval of the
details of the events that brought about the beliefs. We developed
a task in which only retrospective attribution, but not prospective
belief tracking, would allow children to correctly infer that some-
one had a false belief. Eighteen- and 36-month-old children ob-
served a displacement event, which was witnessed by a person
wearing sunglasses (Experiment 1). Having later discovered that
the sunglasses were opaque, 36-month-olds correctly inferred that
the personmust have formed a false belief about the location of the
objects and used this inference in resolving her referential expres-
sions. They successfully performed retrospective revision in the op-
posite direction as well, correcting a mistakenly attributed false
belief when this was necessary (Experiment 3). Thus, children can
compute beliefs retrospectively, based on episodic memories, well
before they pass explicit false-belief tasks. Eighteen-month-olds
failed in such a task, suggesting that they cannot retrospectively
attribute beliefs or revise their initial belief attributions. However,
an additional experiment provided evidence for prospective track-
ing of false beliefs in 18-month-olds (Experiment 2). Beyond identi-
fying two different modes for tracking and updating others’ mental
states early in development, these results also provide clear evi-
dence of episodic memory retrieval in young children.
theory of mind | episodic memory | memory development | prospective
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Humans are undoubtedly ultrasocial beings: they live theirlives in an almost continuous flow of interactions (1). This
ubiquitous sociality imposes an enormous sociocognitive demand:
To engage in communication, collaborations, or any event that is
governed by socially formed concepts, such as norms or customs,
they need to be able to take into account the mental states of their
social partners. Accordingly, everyday functioning requires hu-
mans to become experts in monitoring others’ minds to predict
and interpret their behavior and their utterances, an ability also
termed theory of mind (ToM).
Although an abundance of studies has investigated whether,
and under what circumstances, children and adults attribute
mental states, there is only scarce empirical evidence regarding
the processes involved in how people compute and dynamically
update attributed mental states in real time. In the typical par-
adigms used for testing ToM competencies, the participant is
exposed to the following event sequence: a character, Sally, puts
her marble into a basket and leaves. Another character, Anne,
moves the marble to a box before Sally returns for her marble. In
the explicit version of the task, at this moment, participants are
prompted to answer direct questions regarding Sally’s impending
action, which require them to take into account her beliefs about
the situation (2, 3). Young children usually fail to answer these
questions correctly, but implicit versions of this task, developed
in the last 2 decades, have provided ample evidence that infants,
similarly to adults, can track a character’s beliefs, even without
being asked to do so, as reflected by their looking times (4–6),
anticipatory looks (7, 8), or active behavior (9, 10). However,
whether the tasks were implicit or explicit, previous studies relied
on protocols that did not allow disentangling the different cog-
nitive mechanisms required for passing the tasks.
In particular, it is unclear how and at what point of the event
stream beliefs are computed and attributed in these tasks. Taking
the above location-change paradigm as an example, belief attri-
bution could take place at the beginning of the story, when Sally
puts her marble into the basket; at the end, when the participant is
prompted to predict Sally’s behavior; or in between, for example,
when Anne relocates the marble. Crucially, these options differ
not only in timing but also in inferential and computational re-
quirements: Different functional mechanisms may be recruited at
the different points of the scenario. Attributing a (true) belief at
the beginning of the story, when the protagonist’s perceptual ac-
cess to a state of affairs is encoded, requires the maintenance of
this attributed belief, despite changes of reality, as the events
unfold, to succeed in the task (11). This can be termed prospective
belief attribution because it may or may not have any immediate
use for the observer, but the attributed belief can be stored and
maintained in case it is required in further inferences. Such a
prospective mechanism of belief attribution does not even have to
track the truth-value of the belief for enabling passing a false-
belief (FB) task, and does not necessarily require encoding the
source event that led to belief attribution.
In contrast, if belief attribution takes place at the end of the
story, when the content of the relevant belief is needed for action
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prediction, computing the content of the belief must be based on
a memory search targeting all relevant information that can
potentially contribute to the identification of such content. This
search may be triggered spontaneously in implicit tasks (e.g., by
the reappearance of the actor whose belief is relevant; i.e., when
Sally returns to find her marble), or by the direct question re-
garding the protagonist’s beliefs or actions in explicit tasks. Al-
though this retrospective mechanism of belief attribution does
not require continuous tracking and maintenance of attributed
beliefs, it can only be performed successfully if all relevant details
of past events are faithfully preserved and accessible when
needed. For instance, to pass (explicit or implicit version of) the
Sally–Anne task by retrospective belief attribution, one should
recall the episode when Sally put her marble into the basket,
trace the intervening events related to her and/or the marble
(e.g., that she did not see the transfer), and infer that Sally still
believes her marble is in the basket.
In essence, these routes of belief attribution also presume dif-
ferences in how changes to attributed beliefs are traced. In pro-
spective tracking, attributed beliefs can be updated: an initially
ascribed and maintained belief can be modified when a new belief-
relevant event occurs that necessitates such a change. There is
emergent evidence that children can perform such updates with
respect to their own representations (12), and perhaps also with
respect to attributed beliefs (13, 14). For example, infants in the
second year of life understand that an actor’s FB about the lo-
cation of an object can be corrected by communication (13, 14).
Thus, in prospective belief tracking, observers monitor relevant
events continuously, and as soon as the belief of the agent should
change, they also perform the appropriate updates.
However, retrospective, memory-based belief inferences would
also allow people to retrieve and revise information that may not
have been taken into account in prospective belief attribution.
Such retrospective revisions are initiated when some information
indicates that a belief might have been incorrectly attributed and
must be revised. In contrast to the prospective updates, such re-
visions correct one’s own earlier inference (what one thinks about
an agent’s belief, whereas the agent’s belief itself is not thought to
change), and require the retrieval of episodic memories of the
sources of this inference. Thus, episodic retrieval is an important
mechanism for retrospective belief revision: in case novel infor-
mation comes up regarding the past context that induced pro-
spective belief attribution, one can retrospectively recompute the
content of already attributed beliefs (15).
These two mechanisms of belief attribution and belief tracking
are not mutually exclusive, but may work in an integrated manner.
If, for example, Sally’s belief is attributed when Anne relocates the
marble, it might be based on retrospective recalling of what hap-
pened before (Sally saw the marble in the basket), and the
resulting belief should be prospectively maintained until it is
exploited for action prediction. Importantly, in the common FB
tasks, these computational strategies cannot be disentangled be-
cause they predict similar outcomes. It is possible that successful
performance in these tasks is simply based on prospective belief
attribution and maintenance of these attributed beliefs throughout
the event. In fact, because retrieving past episodes poses difficulty
for young children (16, 17), it is a plausible assumption that their
successful performance in implicit FB tasks relies on prospective,
rather than retrospective, attributing mechanisms. The purpose of
the present study was to test whether and when retrospective at-
tribution mechanisms are available to children in implicit tasks. To
achieve this aim, we had to develop a task that cannot be solved by
purely prospective belief computations.
Experiment 1
We developed a paradigm relying on the referential disambigu-
ation ToM task of Southgate et al. (18). The crucial manipula-
tion we introduced was a belief revision phase in between the
belief induction phase and the test. The task had the following
structure: In the belief induction phase, an experimenter (E1)
hid two novel objects into two boxes; later, while wearing sun-
glasses, she “witnessed” as the location of the two objects were
swapped. This scene may lead to the prospective attribution of a
true belief (TB) to E1 about the respective location of the ob-
jects, given that sunglasses are usually transparent. In the belief
revision phase, while E1 was away, the participants explored her
sunglasses, which turned out to be either opaque or transparent.
In the condition where the sunglasses were opaque, to correctly
track E1’s belief, children had to retrospectively revise its status
from TB to FB and recompute its content regarding the location
of the objects. We label this condition TB-FB, indicating that, to
succeed, children had to retrospectively change the status of the
attributed belief from true to false. In the condition where the
sunglasses were transparent, retrospective revision of the at-
tributed belief was not necessary (TB-TB condition).
In the subsequent test phase, E1 returned, pointed to one of the
boxes, and asked for an object. The dependent measure of the
study was whether children, in response to this request, gave her
the object from the referred or from the other (nonreferred) box.
In line with the original study (18), we built our predictions on the
following consideration: when the experimenter pointed to the box
containing an object, children would not interpret the gesture as
referring to the box itself; rather, they should map it to the object
hidden inside. Importantly, this referent mapping is dependent on
the attributed belief: E1’s gesture must refer to the object she
(truly or falsely) believes to be located in that particular box. If
children in our task retrospectively revise the TB to a FB when the
sunglasses turn out to be opaque during the belief revision phase
(TB-FB condition), they should choose the nonreferred box. In
contrast, children are expected to choose the referred box in the
TB-TB condition, when such a revision was not required.
We tested whether these memory-based retrospective belief
attribution mechanisms were available for 18- and 36-mo-old
children. The younger group represents an age when infants have
been shown to pass interactive FB tasks (9, 10, 18, 19), and the
older group targeted the age when episodic memory capacities
seem to emerge (20, 21).
The number of infants who chose the referred and the non-
referred box in each condition is depicted in Fig. 1. The infants in
the younger age group preferred to give the experimenter the
referred object in both conditions: Twelve infants chose the re-
ferred box and 4 infants chose the nonreferred one in the TB-TB
condition, and 11 infants chose the referred box and 4 infants
chose the nonreferred one in the TB-FB condition. In contrast,
the 36-mo-olds displayed a different pattern across the two
conditions: in the TB-TB condition, 16 participants chose the
referred box and 2 chose the nonreferred one, whereas in the
Fig. 1. Number of children choosing the referred or nonreferred box as a
function of condition and age in Experiments 1, 2, and 3.
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TB-FB condition, only 6 children chose the referred box and 12
chose the nonreferred one.
A 2 × 2 (age × condition) log-linear analysis revealed that the
pattern of answers across the conditions differed in the two age
groups significantly (G2 = 13.98; df = 4; P < 0.01). Fisher’s exact
tests show that although in 18-mo-olds there was no difference
between the conditions (P = 1.000), in the 36-mo-old sample, the
number of children choosing the referred box differed significantly
between the TB-TB and TB-FB conditions (P = 0.002). This
analysis targeted our main question; specifically, whether the re-
sponse pattern in the TB-FB condition in the two age groups
shifted away from that of the TB-TB condition. Children’s natural
(baseline) response to a request accompanied by a pointing gesture
is not a random choice between the available options, but it is better
represented by the pattern they produced in the TB-TB condition.
These results revealed no evidence that the 18-mo-olds would
have considered their experience with the sunglasses as relevant to
their response to E1’s request. However, the 36-mo-olds behaved
differently in the two conditions, suggesting that they were able to
identify that, in the TB-FB condition, the information revealed
about the opacity of the sunglasses during the belief revision phase
was relevant for E1’s belief state. As a consequence, they must
have recalled that E1 had been wearing sunglasses during the
location change event, retrospectively recomputed her belief
about the location of the objects, and used this information to
respond to her request.
The failure of the 18-mo-olds in the TB-FB condition might be
a result of prospectively maintaining the already attributed belief
during the belief revision phase (i.e., attributing TBs in both
conditions). However, it is also possible that the infants simply
followed the referential request of the model (by giving her the
referred object in both conditions) without paying attention to
her potential belief content in either condition. Experiment 2
investigated this question.
Experiment 2
Considering that Southgate et al. (18) found that 17-mo-olds re-
solved an ambiguous referential request by appealing to the (true
or false) belief of their interlocutor, the 18-mo-olds’ failure in
Experiment 1 seems unlikely to be because of their inability to
take into account FBs per se. However, one might argue that they
did not consider the opacity of the sunglasses as causally relevant
for the belief states of the actor (but see ref. 22). In Experiment 2,
we tested whether information about the opacity of the sunglasses
revealed before the encoding of E1’s belief would lead infants to
prospectively infer that she would have a FB. If 18-mo-olds pass
this test, it would indicate that immaturity of belief revision
mechanisms (rather than deficient belief attribution mechanisms)
made them ignore this causally relevant information about the
sunglasses in Experiment 1.
The infants were shown a pair of opaque sunglasses to explore
during familiarization, and then E1 wore the very same sunglasses
(identical to the ones introduced in Experiment 1) during the belief
induction phase. Thus, in this experiment, the infants knew in
advance that the sunglasses worn by E1 while observing the swap of
the objects were opaque (hence we call it the FB-FB condition).
In Experiment 2, five 18-mo-old infants chose the referred box
and 10 infants chose the nonreferred one (Fig. 1). The results of
this experiment were compared with those of the two conditions
with 18-mo-olds from Experiment 1. A 2 × 3 χ2 test revealed a
difference in the pattern of choices between the three conditions
(χ2 = 7.29; df = 2; P = 0.029). Follow-up Fisher’s exact tests
confirmed that the number of infants choosing the referred box
differed significantly between the TB-TB and FB-FB conditions
(P = 0.022), and also between the TB-FB and FB-FB conditions
(Fisher’s exact P = 0.033). This pattern of results suggests that, in
contrast to Experiment 1, infants could take into account the
(false) belief state of E1 when responding her request. This
finding essentially replicates that of Southgate et al. (18).
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we intended to provide a conceptual replication
of the finding that 36-mo-olds revise an attributed belief retro-
spectively (Experiment 1). To this end, we reversed the direction
of belief revision. If 36-mo-olds can perform flexible retrospec-
tive belief revision, this should be independent of whether the
starting point is a TB or a FB. Thus, we tested whether 36-mo-
olds revised an attributed FB when they subsequently learned
that the agent could have witnessed the situation that they ini-
tially thought had not been perceived by her. We hypothesized
36-mo-olds would be able to infer that the agent should have a
TB, rather than a FB.
During the experiment, children witnessed events that were
similar to Experiments 1 and 2, except that E1 left the room while
the location change of the objects took place. Children were then
asked to accompany E2 to the other room to invite E1 back. When
they entered the other room, children in the FB-TB condition
observed E1 peeking into the experimental room through a one-
way mirror. In contrast, when they collected E1 in the FB-FB
condition, they did not receive such information (the mirror was
covered). When E1 was back, she requested an object from the
children the same way as in Experiments 1 and 2.
In response to this request, 15 participants chose the nonreferred
box and three chose the referred one in the FB-FB condition.
However, in the FB-TB condition, in which they witnessed E1
peeking through the one-way mirror, 16 children chose the referred
box, and only two of them chose the nonreferred one (Fig. 1).
Fisher’s exact test confirmed that the number of children choosing
the referred box differed significantly between the FB-TB and FB-
FB conditions (P = 0.0001).
This pattern of results corroborates data from Experiment 1. It
confirms that in the FB-FB condition, the 36-mo-olds attributed
a FB to E1 and responded to her request accordingly. More
important, the children in the FB-TB condition recomputed E1’s
belief about the location of the objects and attributed her a TB.
This suggests that they detected the relevance of the one-way
mirror and understood that E1 could have had visual access to
the location change of the objects.
Discussion
Tracking what others know and believe plays an important role in
human communication because utterances have to be designed in
production, and interpreted in comprehension, in the context of
the mental states of one’s interlocutor (23). It has been previously
demonstrated that infants can disambiguate referential expres-
sions by appealing to the belief content of the communicator, even
when this belief is false (18). We confirmed this finding in the FB-
FB conditions of Experiments 2 and 3, in which children had in-
formation about the fact that E1 did not have perceptual access to
the location change of the objects, and were able to use this in
interpreting her referential expressions. Experiment 2 provided
further evidence that 18-mo-olds are able to apply their self-
experience (regarding the opacity of the sunglasses) to assess the
experimenter’s lack of visual access (22).
Importantly, however, in Experiments 1 and 3, 36-mo-olds
(but not 18-mo-olds) displayed sophisticated belief revision ca-
pacities as well. In Experiment 1, they revised a TB into a false
one without directly observing the communicator’s lack of per-
ceptual access generating her FB. In Experiment 3, they also
succeeded in such a revision in reversed order, revising a FB into
a TB, without directly witnessing that the communicator had
perceptual access to the crucial events. Although the presence of
an actor usually leads to TB attributions and the absence to false
ones, the 36-mo-olds in our study could overcome this rule when
needed. However, in contrast to earlier studies (13, 14), children
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here did not prospectively update the actor’s belief when its
content changed, but corrected their earlier mistaken inferences
regarding this belief. In other words, they performed a retro-
spective belief revision. Thus, at the age of 3 y, when young chil-
dren do not normally succeed on explicit FB task (but see ref. 24),
they demonstrate efficient retrospective belief revision abilities
relying on episodic memories, recruiting complex belief compu-
tation processes that likely involve backtrack reasoning and
reevaluating causal relations that lead to a particular belief, which
can be difficult even for adults (25).
FB attribution in all three experiments required inferential
processes, however: 36-mo-olds in Experiments 1 and 3 could not
have succeeded in the task without invoking memories of specific
past events into their inferences. In particular, at some point of the
procedure, they must have recollected the location-swap event
during the belief induction phase to combine this memory with the
later acquired information about the sunglasses (Experiment 1) or
one-way mirror (Experiment 3) to recompute E1’s belief content.
Thus, the results of our study cannot be explained by prospective
attribution and updating mechanisms and demonstrate the oper-
ation of retrospective belief attribution mechanisms in 36-mo-olds.
Nevertheless, our findings leave open questions regarding the
nature of these mechanisms. Here we consider three alternative
scenarios, which differ in the assumptions as to when initial belief
attribution took place and what events triggered these attribution
processes. Belief attribution could have been initiated by the ob-
servation of E1’s perceptual access regarding the location of the
objects during the belief induction phase (or the lack of it), by the
need to interpret her request in the test phase, or by acquiring
information about the opacity of the sunglasses or the presence of
the one-way mirror during the belief revision phase. These alter-
native scenarios assign different roles to the episodic memory-based
retrospective processes that must have operated during the task to
result in the correct responses that we observed in 36-mo-olds.
The first and most plausible way to think about retrospective
attribution mechanisms is that they always operate on, and mod-
ulate, already-attributed (true or false) beliefs. According to this
option, the primary mechanism of belief attribution is the pro-
spective route: children always attribute (true) beliefs when they
observe an agent’s perceptual access to some relevant facts and
then maintain these attribution across events, updating the belief
content when it is necessary. Thus, children in the standard
location-change FB tasks (and our participants in Experiments 2
and 3) initially attribute a TB about the object’s location to the
protagonist (E1 in our study), and then maintain this belief attri-
bution when the content of the belief becomes false in the absence
of the protagonist (as in Experiment 3), or in the lack of per-
ceptual access of the experimenter (wearing opaque sunglasses in
Experiment 2). In the present study, when 36-mo-olds learnt about
the opacity of the sunglasses in the TB-FB condition of Experi-
ment 1, and subsequently recomputed the content of the experi-
menter’s belief, they did not attribute a new belief to her, but
rather revised or corrected a prospectively attributed belief. To be
able to do so, they must have stored not only the content of this
belief but also some relevant facts about the source of this attri-
bution (i.e., E1’s perceptual access to the objects’ location) and
history of updates (e.g., when location change occurred within the
stream of events). Then either at the point when they found out
that the sunglasses were opaque or at the point when they had to
evaluate E1’s referential expression, they retrospectively revised
the source information and the update history of the attributed
belief in light of what they learnt about the sunglasses, and
recalculated the content of E1’s belief accordingly. Although they
had to preform similar revisions (with opposing directionality)
when they were exposed to the one-way mirror of the FB-TB con-
dition of Experiment 3, there was no need for such a revision in the
TB-TB condition of Experiment 1 or in the FB-FB of condition of
Experiment 3.
If this is the correct interpretation of retrospective attribution,
then the 18-mo-olds’ failure in Experiment 1 was the result of the
inaccessibility of source and update information either because
of failing to retrieve it from memory or because of failing to
encode it in the first place. In either case, these infants were
unable to revise their prospective belief attribution and errone-
ously relied on it in the test phase.
Second, in principle it is possible that all responses in our
tasks, and even in the majority of FB tasks, were based on purely
retrospective mechanisms. If children possess sufficiently accu-
rate mechanisms of recalling relevant details of past events, they
could calculate the belief content of the communicator at the
time when they need it (i.e., when they have to predict her action
or interpret her request).
With respect to our findings, this option would assume that the
children in all conditions calculated the content of E1’s relevant
belief when she pointed to a box and asked for an object. This belief
attribution process would have been similar in the TB-FB/FB-TB
and TB-TB/FB-FB conditions, except that the perceptual access of
the experimenter to the location-change event had to be evaluated
differently, depending on the subsequently acquired information
concerning the transparency or opacity of the sunglasses and the
presence of the one-way mirror. If this interpretation were correct,
the 18-mo-olds’ failure in Experiment 1 would not be a result of
memory limitation or to the absence of retrospective attribution
mechanisms, but an inferential deficiency: They would not have
recognized that the information they learnt about the sunglasses or
the one-way mirror was relevant to the evaluation of E1’s percep-
tual access to the earlier event that fixed the belief content.
Although on the basis of our study we cannot exclude this ex-
planation, we find this option, which completely eliminates pro-
spective attribution processes, unlikely: building a belief attribution
system entirely on retrospective mechanisms would require highly
reliable, fast, and accurate retrieval of events from episodic mem-
ory. Considering that even adults’ episodic memory fails to meet
these standards (26, 27), and young children’s ability to recall past
events is much weaker than that of adults (28–30), the wide range of
findings on early belief attribution calls for mechanisms that should
not exclusively depend on memory.
A third possible way of interpreting the role of retrospective
belief attribution in theory of mind is to link it to belief update
mechanisms that operate on one’s own beliefs. According to this
option, an initial prospective TB attribution is not mandatory, and
both prospective and retrospective attribution and revision mecha-
nisms are triggered when the contents of one’s own beliefs are
updated or revised. In the standard, location-change FB task, the
informational access of the protagonist to the location of the marble
does not have to be recorded by creating a separate (meta)repre-
sentation; it can be represented by simply tagging the child’s own
representation of the location by the protagonist, indicating that she
has access to this information (31). When the marble is relocated
and content of this representation is updated accordingly, the tag-
ging is also updated. If the protagonist has perceptual access to
the change, the tagging is maintained on the representation; if she
does not have access, a new representation is created and attributed
to her with the old content. This latter process is a prospective at-
tribution of a FB, triggered not by perceptual access but by the lack
of it. This form of belief attribution would thus have both retro-
spective and prospective elements, and although it is not a revision
of an already-attributed belief, it is triggered by the revision of
own beliefs, also taking into account the perceptual access of the
protagonist.
Such prospective FB attribution would explain infants’ success in
the FB-FB task of Experiment 2 (as well as in ref. 18). However, in
Experiment 1, children had to update their representation of cur-
rent reality not only when the locations of the objects were swapped
but also when they learned that the sunglasses, which they initially
believed to be transparent, were opaque. This revision process
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might have triggered the search for additional representations,
linked to the updated information, to be revised. Indeed, it has been
suggested that one function of episodic memory is to allow us to
revise our own beliefs on the basis of new information related to the
original source of those beliefs (15). Such a search might have led
the 36-mo-olds in Experiment 1 to memories related to E1, who had
previously worn the sunglasses, and might have allowed them to
retrospectively reevaluate her perceptual access to the location
change event. As a consequence, they could remove E1’s tag from
their own representation of true reality and could create a new
representation by attributing to her the FB with the content of the
location of the objects before the swapping took place. In Experi-
ment 3, having learnt about the one-way mirror, children could
revise the attributed belief the same way as described in the first
option above, and such a revision would be triggered by learning
about the presence of the one-way mirror.
If this is the right interpretation of the results, 18-mo-olds might
have failed to attribute a FB in Experiment 1 because their search
for to-be-revised information related to the opacity of the sun-
glasses did not lead them to the memory of the particular event
during which the experimenter had worn those sunglasses. In other
words, weak or unreliable memory traces, or immature recollection
processes, could explain their failure.
The question of which of these alternative accounts explains our
findings best is beyond the scope of this article and will have to
await for further investigations. Nevertheless, our study demon-
strates that retrospective belief attribution mechanisms are available
to children from at least 3 years of age, which raises the question of
whether all findings in the relevant literature on mind reading are to
be explained by purely prospective mechanisms. In addition, this
pattern of results suggests that updating and revision of attributed
beliefs relies on flexible manipulation of representations and met-
arepresentations even in so-called implicit ToM tasks and at an age
at which children have been claimed to lack proper ToM abilities
(32). Such a conclusion is inconsistent with views that explain young
children’s performance in such tasks by associative learning (33) or
by tracking agent-object relations (32), as these approaches do not
include options for combining belief-relevant information originat-
ing from different sources, such as episodic memory.
Furthermore, our study provides evidence of episodic retrieval
processes, which are necessary for retrospective belief revision, at
the age of 36 mo. There is a growing body of evidence that 3-year-
old children perform well on certain episodic memory tasks (21, 34–
36). For example, in a typical task (21), children first dig up a locked
treasure-case from a sandbox, and later in another room they are
allowed to select one of three items (a key and two distractor ob-
jects) to take back to the sandbox scene. Three-year-olds chose the
key if the delay between the events was 15 min or less. Although
such results demonstrate that children can use information ac-
quired during a past event for an upcoming event, this achievement
can be based on carrying over some semantic information extracted
from that past event (“sandboxes have locked treasure cases”) or on
tracking current states of affairs (“there is a locked treasure case in
that sandbox”) without retrieving the details of a specific past event.
In contrast to such tasks, our paradigm required children to
recall episodic information related to E1 and a specific event,
which could not have been achieved by recalling semantic in-
formation about her, about sunglasses or one-way mirrors, or
about object location, or by tracking states of affairs concerning
these elements separately. In other words, having learnt that the
sunglasses were opaque or that E1 had visual access to the ex-
perimental room, children had to retrieve the specific event when
E1 had worn those glasses or what had happened in that room,
and only within the frame of the original event could they infer the
consequences of seeing or not seeing the location change. This
retrospective attribution process is in line with proposals that
episodic memories enable updating the inferential consequences
of past events in light of newly acquired information (15). The
present study thus provides clear evidence that 36-mo-olds can
recollect episodes (at least within a minute delay) in sufficient
detail to be used for revising their inferences regarding the beliefs
of interacting partners.
Methods
The experiments were approved by the ethical committee of Eötvös Loránd
University. Parents of all participants signed an informed consent form be-
fore starting the experiments.
Experiment 1.
Participants. The planned sample size was 40 children for each age group (18-
and 36-mo-olds), equally distributed to the two conditions. Three 18-mo-olds
and a single 36-mo-old were excluded and replaced because of experimenter
error. Some children did not make a choice or chose both boxes during the
test: nine 18-mo-olds (TB-TB condition: four, TB-FB condition: five) and four
36-mo-olds (TB-TB condition: two, TB-FB condition: two). Because these
participants completed the task, they were not replaced. Thus, the final
sample that produced evaluable data included 31 18-mo-olds (TB-TB condi-
tion: 16; TB-FB condition: 15; mean age, 18.1 mo; range: 17.5–18.5 mo) and 36
36-mo-olds (TB-TB condition: 18; TB-FB condition: 18; mean age, 36.3 mo,
range: 35.0–36.9 mo).
Materials. A toy egg and a toy carrot were used in the warm-up trials. Two
novel objects made specifically for this study were used in the test trials. Two
cardboard boxes (a green one and an orange one) with a lid were used as
hiding containers. A pair of ordinary (transparent) sunglasses was used in the
familiarization phase, and different but similar-looking sunglasses were used
in the test phase, which were transparent in the TB-TB condition and opaque
in the TB-FB condition.
Procedure. The procedure was a modified version of the task of Southgate
et al. (18).
Familiarization. Children were seated on the floor with their parent and
were shown a pair of ordinary (transparent) sunglasses by E1 to make sure
that they were familiar with the object and its use.
Warm-up trials. E1, wearing sunglasses on her head as a hairband, kneeled
in between the two cardboard boxes, which were 100 cm apart and 120 cm
from the child. First she gave the child a toy egg and a toy carrot to play with
for roughly 10 s. She then placed one object in each box and asked the child to
retrieve first one then the other (by naming them). The hiding game con-
tinued until the child correctly chose the requested objects twice in a row
from two different boxes.
Test trial. The test trial consisted of three phases: a belief induction phase, a
belief revision phase, and a test phase.
Belief induction phase. E1 gave the children the two novel objects to explore
for about 10 s. These objects were not labeled in this phase. E1 then placed
one object in each box and closed the lids. The location of the objects was
counterbalanced across infants. At this point, E2 asked E1 to put on her
sunglasses. E1 then put her sunglasses from her head on her eyes and sat back,
but stayed in the room facing the subsequent events. E2 then deceptively
approached the boxes (gesturing “shush” toward the child, following the
protocol of ref. 18), switched the objects, closed the boxes, and asked E1 to
leave the room with her. Before leaving, E1 removed her sunglasses and left
them in front of the participant.
Belief revision phase. At this point, the child was encouraged by the parent
to try on the sunglasses. Before the experiment, the parents had been told
that, when they are left alone, they should ask their child to try on the
sunglasses and verify together whether they could see through them. The
parents had been informed in advance whether the sunglasses were opaque
or transparent to avoid explicit signals of their own surprise. Importantly, in
the TB-TB condition, the sunglasses were transparent, but in the TB-FB
condition, they were opaque.
Test phase. After being away for ∼45 s, E1 returned to the room, greeted
the infant, and sat on the floor behind the two boxes. E1 then pointed at
one of the boxes (counterbalanced across infants) and said (in Hungarian),
“Do you remember what I put here? I put a sefo here. Shall we play with the
sefo?” alternating gaze between the infant and the referred box twice
(“sefo” is a phonotactically valid pseudoword in Hungarian). E1 then gras-
ped both boxes, extended her arms toward the child, and simultaneously
opened the lids of both boxes that were oriented toward the child while
looking at the child. At this point, the contents of the boxes became visible
only to the child. E1 then said, “Can you give me the sefo?” while looking
directly at the child and not looking toward either box. E1 repeated the
question until the child began to approach one of the boxes or pointed
toward one of the boxes, or until 180 s had passed.
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Coding. The sessions were video-recorded and coded offline. All parents
followed the instructions and ensured that, during the belief revision phase,
their children noticed whether they could see through the sunglasses. The
parental utterances during this phase were transcribed and analyzed. The
analyses yielded no significant difference in the number or in the length of
the utterances across the two age groups (for details, see the SI Appendix).
The dependentmeasure during the test phase was the choice that children
made in response to E1’s request. The first response toward one of the boxes,
after E1 had said, “Can you give me the sefo?” was coded as the child’s
choice and was categorized as choosing the referred or the nonreferred box.
Both reaching and pointing responses were accepted as valid choices. All
sessions were coded also by a second observer, blind to the experimental
condition, watching only the recordings of the test phase. Interrater
agreement was 96% (Cohen’s Kappa, 0.91).
Experiment 2.
Participants. Twenty 18-mo-old infants were recruited for this experiment.
Because of experimenter error, one infant was excluded andwas replaced. Of
the 20 infants, five did not make a choice during the test phase. The
remaining 15 infants (mean age, 18.0 mo; range, 17.5–18.5 mo) constituted
the final sample for this experiment.
Materials. The same props were used as in Experiment 1, with the exception of
the sunglasses. A single pair of opaque sunglasses was used in this study.
Procedure. The procedure used in this experimentwas identical to Experiment 1,
with the following exceptions. Infants were shown a pair of opaque sunglasses
to explore during familiarization, and E1wore the very same sunglasses during
the belief induction phase (during the location change). Then E1 left the room
for about 45 s, leaving thepair of sunglasses behind. However, parentswerenot
instructed to explore the sunglasses with their child. Thereby the belief revision
phase was skipped but the delay between the belief induction and test phases
was kept identical to that of Experiment 1.
Coding. The coding of the dependent variable was the same as in Experiment
1. Interrater agreement was 93% (Cohen’s Kappa, 0.87).
Experiment 3.
Participants. Forty 36-mo-old children were recruited. Three children were
excluded because of experimenter error, and were replaced. Of the 40 in-
fants, four did not make a choice during the test phase. The remaining 36
infants (TB-TB condition: 18; TB-FB condition: 18; mean age, 36.3 mo; range,
35.1–36.9 mo) constituted the final sample.
Materials. The same props were used as in Experiment 1, with the exception of
the sunglasses.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiments 1 and 2, with the ex-
ception that the belief manipulation was not implemented by sunglasses, but
by an unexpected one-way mirror. The warm-up trials were similar to
Experiment 1.
Belief induction phase. This was identical to Experiment 1 and 2, up to the
point when the objects were placed in the boxes. At this point, E2 asked E1 to
leave the room. E2 then approached the boxes, switched the location of the
objects, and closed the boxes.
Belief revision phase. The child was asked by E2 to call E1 back from the
adjacent room (parents were allowed to join). They entered the other room,
where children saw E1 either peeking into the experimental room through a
one-way mirror (FB-TB condition) or reading a book while the mirror was
covered (FB-FB condition). In the FB-TB condition, E2 encouraged the child to
look through the one-way mirror. After ∼45 s, E2 asked E1 and the child to
return to the experimental room.
Test phase. This was identical to that of Experiment 1.
Coding. Coding of the dependent variable was the same as in Experiment 1
and 2. Interrater agreement was 97% (Cohen’s Kappa, 0.944).
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